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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
TORTS - LIABILITY OF OWNER FOR THE NEGLIGENT
DRIVING OF AUTOMOBILE THIEF
The defendant owned and operated a used car lot. The keys to
one of the cars were stolen by a fourteen-year old boy who was
in the habit of playing there. The defendant, aware of the theft,
reported it to the police but did not change the ignition lock or
take other precautions to prevent the car from being stolen.
Two days later, while the lot was unattended, another fourteen-
year old boy used the stolen keys to drive the car off the lot.
His negligent driving caused injury to the plaintiff, who sued
the owner for damages. The trial court held that the facts
alleged failed to state a cause of action. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, held reversed and remanded. One in-
jured by the negligent driving of a child automobile thief states
a cause of action against the owner of the automobile by alleging
that the owner knew that children played on his lot and that the
keys had been stolen. Whether the defendant took reasonable
precautions to prevent the car from being stolen is a question
for the jury. Anderson v. Bushong Pontiac Co., 404 Pa. 382, 171
A.2d 771 (1961).
Most attempts to hold an automobile owner liable for the
negligent driving of one who has stolen his car have involved a
private owner who had parked his car with the keys left in the
ignition switch.1 No prior theft of the keys has been involved.
The courts, when faced with these situations, have usually arti-
culated the issues in terms of "foreseeability" and "proximate
cause." The problem in these cases has been whether the owner
owes a duty to the plaintiff or, if so, whether the duty has been
breached. 2 In resolving both of these matters, the courts have
1. See, e.g., Fulco v. City Ice Service, 59 So.2d 198 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951)
Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So.2d 573 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) ; Castay v. Katz &
Besthoff, 148 So. 76 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1933) ; Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal.2d
60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954) ; Kiste v. Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d
395 (1952) ; Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E.2d 330 (1945) ; Slater v.
Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N.E. 778 (1927) ; Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn.
369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950) ; Permenter v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 229 Miss. 385,
91 So.2d 243 (1956) ; Saracco v. Lyttle, 11 N.J. Super. 254, 78 A.2d 288 (1951)
Rapczynski v. Cowan, 138 Pa. Super. 392, 10 A.2d 810 (1939).
2. See PROSSER, TORTS 276 (2d ed. 1955) : "Almost invariably these cases
present no issue of causation in fact, since the defendant has created a situation
acted upon by another force [the negligence of the thief] to bring about the result;
and to deal with them in terms of 'proximate cause' is only to avoid the real issue.
The question is one of negligence and the extent of the obligation: whether the
defendant's responsibility extends to such interventions which are foreign to the
risk he has created. It might be stated as a problem of duty to protect the
plaintiff against such an intervening cause. A decision that the defendant's con-
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articulated the applicable test as whether the defendant-owner
should have foreseen or anticipated that his car might be stolen
and that someone might be injured by the thief's negligent
driving.
In some jurisdictions a statute3 or ordinance prohibits leaving
keys in an unattended automobile. It has been held as a matter
of law that the breach of such a statute is negligence and is the
"proximate cause" of the injury negligently inflicted by the
thief.4 In some decisions, the statute has been viewed as designed
to promote the safety of the public from negligent automobile
thieves.5 However, a majority of courts have construed its pur-
pose to be the protection of automobile owners or an aid to law
enforcement officers and have not held the owner liable for the
thief's negligence."
In those jurisdictions where no statute exists, recovery
against the owner is generally denied. Various reasons in sup-
port of these decisions have been given, e.g., lack of reasonable
grounds to anticipate the thief's action, 7 the thief's negligence
alone was the "proximate cause" of the injury" or the owner's
negligence was not the "proximate cause."9 A few courts have
held that a jury is to decide negligence and "proximate cause"
even though no statute prohibits leaving keys in unattended auto-
mobiles.' 0
Louisiana does not, by statute, prohibit leaving keys in the
switch of an unattended automobile. The Louisiana courts have
duct is not the 'proximate cause' of the result means only that he has not been
negligent at all, or that his negligence, if any, does not cover such a risk."
3. E.g., 6 MD. CODE art. 66 /2, § 247 (1957), which provides: "No person
driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without
first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and removing the key .. "
4. Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; Ney v. Yellow Cab Co.,
2 Ill.2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954); Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 Ill. App. 359, 77
N.E.2d 537 (1948).
5. E.g., Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; Ostergard v. Frisch,
333 Il1. App. 359, 77 N.E.2d 537 (1948).
6. See, e.g., Frank v. Ralston, 145 F. Supp. 294 (W.D. Ky. 1956) ; Kiste v.
Red Cab, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 106 N.E.2d 395 (1952); Liberto v. Holfeldt,
221 Md. 62, 155 A.2d 698 (1959) ; Gailbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E.2d
560 (1948) ; Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E.2d 330 (1945) ; Slater 'v.
Baker, 261 Mass. 424, 158 N.E. 778 (1927); Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn.
369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950) ; Wannebo v. Gates, 227 Minn. 194, 34 N.W.2d 695
(1948) ; Kennedy v. Hedberg, 159 Minn. 76, 198 N.W. 302 (1924) ; Permenter v.
Milner Chevrolet Co., 229 Miss. 385, 91 So.2d 243 (1956) ; Gower v. Lamb, 282
S.W.2d 867 (Mo. App. 1955).
7. Lustbader v. Traders Delivery Co., 67 A.2d 237 (Md. App. 1949).
S. Teague v. Pritchard, 38 Tenn. App. 686, 279 S.W.2d 706 (1954).
9. Howard v. Swagart, 161 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
10. E.g., Schaff v. R. W. Claxton, Inc., 144 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1944)
Garbo v. Walker, 129 N.E.2d 537 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1955).
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concluded that the owner owes no duty to protect the public at
large against the risk of a thief's negligence" or that the leav-
ing the keys in an unattended automobile does not of itself con-
stitute negligence. 12 However, two decisions have suggested that
if there were a statute prohibiting this type of conduct, an auto-
mobile owner would owe the duty.13
In cases where one has been injured by the intervening negli-
gence of a child automobile thief, some courts have permitted
recovery where they would have denied it if the thief had been
an adult.1 4 However, before such cases are permitted to go to the
jury, it must be shown that the owner had knowledge that chil-
dren frequently played around the automobile. 15 The negligence
is specified as the owner's failure to anticipate and take proper
steps to guard the public against the mischievous propensities
of children.
Generally, no distinction has been made between private and
commercial owners. However, in a recent case 6 it was observed
that the risk of unauthorized use is markedly increased where
one is in the business of selling automobiles.
In the instant case, the court held that the owner owed a duty
to the public at large and left the question of negligence and
"proximate cause" for jury determination. In determining the
duty issue, the court laid emphasis on the fact that the keys were
stolen prior to the theft of the automobile and noted that the
defendant was aware that children frequently played on his lot.
11. Boudreaux v. New Orleans Public Service, 142 So. 802 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1932) ; Tabary v. New Orleans Public Service, 142 So. 800 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1932).
12. Midkiff v. Watkins, 52 So.2d 573 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951) ; Fulco v. City
Ice Service, 59 So.2d 198 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951). See also Town of Jackson v.
Mounger Motors, 98 So.2d 697 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
13. Fulco v. City Ice Service, 59 So.2d 198, 201 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1951)
Maggoire v. Laundry and Dry Cleaning Service, 150 So. 394, 396 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1933).
14. Jackson v. Mills Baking Co., 221 Mich. 64, 190 N.W. 740 (1922) ; Kennedy
v. Hedberg, 159 Minn. 76, 198 N.W. 302 (1924) ; Lomano v. Ideal Towel Supply
Co., 25 N.J. Misc. 162, 51 A.2d 888 (1947) ; Mann v. Parshall, 229 App. Div.
366, 241 N.Y. Supp. 673 (1930).
15. See cases cited in note 14 supra; Tierney v. New York Dugan Bros., Inc.,
288 N.Y. 16, 41 N.E.2d 161 (1942).
16. Murray v. Wright, 166 Cal. App.2d 589, 592, 333 P.2d 111, 113 (1958)
"It is quite apparent that the instant case presents a factual situation far more
serious than the parking of a single car on a city street as in Richards [Richards
v. Stanley, 43 Cal.2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954) ] case. Here it is alleged that
defendants purposely left the keys in the ignitions of all vehicles parked on their
lot which was at all times open and unattended, in order to encourage the general
public to . . . operate the vehicles, and they did so 'without regard for the fitness
or competence of said general public so to do'."
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It was also emphasized that the defendant was a commercial
owner. It is to be noted that the court did not find negligence or
impose liability but merely held that the facts alleged stated
a cause of action. It is submitted that this was a sound conclu-
sion. It required little imagination on the part of the defendant
to suspect that the one who had purloined the keys would return
for the car. The defendant also had reason to suspect that the
keys had been taken by an incompetent driver since he knew that
children were in the habit of playing on the lot. In view of these
facts, it does not seem to be an undue burden on the defendant
to hold that reasonable execution of his duty to the public re-
quired that he change the ignition lock or take some other pre-
caution to prevent the car from being taken by an incompetent
driver. This inconvenience is certainly slight when compared
with its effectiveness in minimizing the risk.
It is suggested, however, that the decision should be limited
to its facts and should not be extended to cases where the keys
are not stolen prior to the theft of the automobile or where the
owner has little or no reason to suspect that the thief would be
an incompetent driver. In the absence of facts which would lead
the reasonable man to anticipate the theft and subsequent injury,
leaving the keys in the switch of an unattended automobile
should not of itself be considered negligence or disregard for the
safety of others such as will justify the imposition of liability.
In determining when an owner should be held to anticipate such
misconduct it is suggested that among the factors to be con-
sidered should be the location of the unattended automobile, the
length of time and the time of day that it was left unattended,
and whether the owner knew that the keys had been previously
stolen.
Frank Fontenot
TRUSTS - PROHIBITED SUBSTITUTIONS
The recent case of Succession of Meadors1 illustrates how the
Louisiana courts have restricted the utility of trusts under the
Trust Estates Law.2 In that case a Tennessee domiciliary be-
1. 135 So. 2d 679 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961) ; cert. denied, 135 So. 2d 679 (La.
1962).
2. LA. R.S. 9:1791-2212 (1950). The legislature is authorized to provide for
trust estates under LA. CONST. art. IV, § 16. Discussions of the Trust Estates
Law are found in Daggett, Comments by Harriet S. Daggett, 3 WEST's LOUISIANA
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